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BRIEF ARTICLE
Generalisation of threat expectancy increases with time
Arne Leera, Dieuwke Sevenstera and Miriam J. J. Lommen b
aClinical Psychology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands; bClinical Psychology and Experimental Psychopathology, University
of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Excessive fear generalisation is a feature characteristic of clinical anxiety and has been
linked to its aetiology. Previous animal studies have shown that the mere passage of
time increases fear generalisation and that brief exposure to training cues prior to
long-term testing reverses this effect. The current study examined these
phenomena in humans. Healthy participants learned the relationship between the
presentation of a picture of a neutral male face and the delivery of a mild shock.
One group was immediately tested with a novel picture of a somewhat different
male face (generalisation test). Another group was tested one week later. A third
group was also tested one week later and was additionally exposed to the training
picture prior to testing. During picture presentations, shock-expectancy ratings were
obtained as a measure of fear. Fear generalisation increased from the immediate
test to the 1-week follow-up test. This result could not be attributed to level of
neuroticism or a general increase in fear (incubation). Furthermore, the time-
dependent increase in fear generalisation vanished following brief exposure to the
training picture. Results indicate that human fear generalisation is a temporally
dynamic process and that memory for stimulus details can be re-established
following a reminder treatment.
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Generalisation of threat expectancy
increases with time
Generalisation of fear learning is an efficient way to
deal with novel, potentially unsafe situations. Adaptive
generalisation is essential for survival in a dynamic
environment. Excessive fear generalisation, however,
in which individuals respond fearfully to a broad
range of innocuous stimuli, is characteristic of patho-
logical fear (Dymond, Dunsmoor, Vervliet, Roche, &
Hermans, 2015). For example, panic disorder (Lissek
et al., 2010), generalised anxiety disorder (Lissek et al.,
2014), and posttraumatic stress disorder (Lissek &
Grillon, 2012) are associated with “overgeneralization”.
Likewise, war veterans who demonstrate high levels of
fear generalisation report more trauma re-experien-
cing symptoms (Kostek et al., 2014). It has further
been theorised that fear generalisation is a key
pathogenic mechanism in the aetiology of anxiety dis-
orders (Kindt, 2014; Lenaert et al., 2014; Lissek et al.,
2010; Lommen, Engelhard, & van den Hout, 2010). In
support, Lenaert et al. (2014) demonstrated in a large
sample of first-year psychology students that level of
fear generalisation is predictive of subclinical anxiety
at 6 months follow-up. Given that fear generalisation
is a risk factor for the development of pathological
fear, mapping the factors that facilitate or reduce it is
of theoretical and clinical importance. It is therefore
surprising that little research has been devoted to the
time-dependent nature of memory consolidation and
memory performance, and its relation to fear general-
isation (Jasnow, Lynch, Gilman, & Riccio, 2017).
Although it has been well documented in the animal
literature that fear generalisation intensifies over time
(Jasnow, Cullen, & Riccio, 2012), it is unknown
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whether human fear generalisation is also a temporally
dynamic rather than static process.
Conditioning theory postulates that (pathological)
fear is a learned response that results from the inter-
action between humans and their environment
(Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). When an initially neutral
stimulus coincides with an intrinsically aversive event
(unconditioned stimulus; US), it (now coined con-
ditioned stimulus; CS) comes to predict the US and
will evoke preparatory fear responses (conditioned
responses; CRs) when encountered on future
occasions. Generalisation, then, refers to the triggering
of CRs by novel stimuli (generalisation stimuli, GSs)
that share some of the elements of the original CS or
are conceptually related (for a review, see Dymond
et al., 2015). As such, fear generalisation is considered
a descriptive term for the behavioural alterations after
fear conditioning, rather than a process or mechanism
(cf. Lenaert et al., 2014; Lissek et al., 2010; Lommen
et al., 2010). Experimental research has uncovered
several conditions under which fear generalisation
takes place, typically employing stimuli that share fea-
tures across a perceptual dimension (Dunsmoor & Paz,
2015). For example, following repeated pairings of a
neutral CS tone and electrocutaneous stimulation,
exposure to similar tones with varying frequencies
(GSs) results in skin conductance responses to these
novel tones that diminish progressively with percep-
tual distance from the CS (Hovland, 1937). Such gener-
alisation gradients –with peak responses to the CS and
successively lower responses to stimuli that resemble
the CS in decreasing steps of perceptual similarity –
also arise with stimuli that share visual features, like
circles of different sizes (e.g. Lissek et al., 2010).
A key factor involved in the strength of fear gener-
alisation thus entails the ability to detect (dis)similari-
ties between novel stimuli and the original CS (Struyf,
Zaman, Vervliet, & Van Diest, 2015). Such detection
relies heavily on initial encoding and subsequent
retrieval of the CS representation. For instance, the
intensity of generalised responding depends on
what specific stimulus features people pay attention
to during learning (e.g. shape or colour), e.g. based
on what the discrimination learning task requires
them to focus on (Vervliet & Geens, 2014). Supposedly,
poor memory of relevant stimulus details fuels fear
generalisation. A crucial finding in this regard is that
memory generally becomes less specific with time.
For example, Bahrick, Clark, and Bahrick (1967)
required participants to identify a target stimulus
(e.g. a drawing of a teacup) that was previously
presented in isolation from an array of perceptually
related stimuli, minutes, hours, or days after encoding.
The number of “false positives”was shown to positively
correlate not onlywith perceptual overlap between the
target and test stimulus, but alsowith retention interval
length. Likewise, Sekeres and colleagues (2016)
demonstrated that over the course of 7 days memory
for peripheral (perceptual) details of naturalistic
events (film clips) was progressively lost, and at a
faster rate than memory for gist elements. Given that
the broadness of generalisation depends heavily on
recall performance, it can be hypothesised that the
mere passage of time causes enhanced fear generalis-
ation. Correspondingly, animal studies have repeatedly
demonstrated that installation of a retention interval
renders previously ineffective stimuli capable of
evoking fear responses (for a review, see Jasnow
et al., 2012). For example,mice trainedwith a footshock
and tested 1, 14, 28, or 36 days later, show stable freez-
ing responses over time in the training context, but in a
novel environment freezing responses gradually
increases over time, which reflects enhanced fear gen-
eralisation (Wiltgen & Silva, 2007). These effects have
been attributed to a more rapid loss of memory for
cues that were present in the training context com-
pared to memory for the CR itself (Jasnow et al.,
2017). From a neurobiological perspective, these
findings are usually explained by the progressive
reduction in hippocampal dependency (as memories
are stored in the cortex), which results in recall of sche-
matic information and consequently a broader range
of stimuli being capable of eliciting the target response
(Jasnow et al., 2017). Whether this time effect on fear
generalisation is similar for humans is still unknown.
A recently published human study on the effect of
stress on fear generalisation found that remote fear
memories (24 h old), but not newly formed fear mem-
ories (15 min old), were sensitive to the effects of stress
(Dunsmoor, Otto, & Phelps, 2017). However, there was
no time effect in the no-stress control conditions,
meaning that there was no evidence that a 24-h inter-
val affects fear generalisation. Possibly, the retention
interval in this study was too short.
Promisingly, numerous animal studies have further
revealed that brief exposure to the training context
prior to testing eliminates fear generalisation to the
novel context (Jasnow et al., 2012). Presumably, such
a reminder treatment reactivates the initial memory,
which re-enables differentiation between the training
context and the test context. Similarly, it has recently
been demonstrated in humans that cuing remote
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(non-trauma-related) episodic memory just prior to
retrieval can restore some of the details that were
initially forgotten over time (Sekeres et al., 2016).
In summary, the animal literature suggests that fear
generalisation is a temporally dynamic process that, if
left untreated, increases with time. Importantly, this
may be of relevance to understanding anxiety-
related disorders. Perhaps surprisingly, however, this
topic has received little attention in the human fear
conditioning literature. We therefore set out to test
in humans the hypothesis that installation of a 1-
week retention interval increases fear generalisation.
To this end, one group was trained and tested on
the same day, and another group was tested 7 days
after training. We further predicted that a reminder
treatment prior to testing reduces this effect. To
examine this second hypothesis, a third group was
tested 7 days after training and was exposed to the
training stimulus just prior to the test phase.
Methods
Participants
Based on a power analysis (d = .80; cf. Leer et al., 2017),
the sample size was set at 60 participants (n = 20 per
group). Seventy-nine undergraduates participated in
exchange for remuneration or course credits. Exclu-
sion criteria were pregnancy, serious medical con-
ditions, (past or present) psychiatric diagnoses,
having an electronic implanted device (e.g. a pace-
maker), pain or problems related to hands or wrists,
and recent use of tranquilisers. Prior to data analysis,
19 participants were excluded because they did not
show acquisition of differential US-expectancy (i.e.
US-expectancy during the final CS trial of the acqui-
sition phase ≤ US-expectancy during the final baseline
trial of the acquisition phase; n = 10), did not show up
at the follow-up test (n = 7), did not respond during
the critical test trial (n = 1), or did not provide data
on more than half of the trials and reported to not
have understood the instructions (n = 1). The final
sample comprised 60 participants (age: M = 21.88,
SD = 2.63, range = 18–31; 37 females) that were allo-
cated by order of appearance to one of three
groups: “Day 1” (n = 21), “Day 8” (n = 19), or “Day 8
reminder” (n = 20).
Apparatus and stimulus material
The conditioning task was programmed in E-Prime 2.0
(Psychology Software Tools) and presented via a 17-
inch monitor (1024 × 768 pixels). Figure 1 shows the
pictures of neutral male faces (511 × 768 pixels) that
served as CS and GS (cf. Leer et al., 2017, exp. 2). The
CS was obtained from the Radboud Faces Database
(Langner et al., 2010). The GS was created by morph-
ing the CS face with another neutral male face from
the Radboud Face Database using Abrosoft Fanta-
morph software. Pictures of faces were used because
initial formation of detailed memory was an important
condition for testing our hypothesis. Arguably, for
memory of abstract stimuli that are built up of only
a few visual elements, e.g. circles, there is less room
for a subsequent reduction in memory detail. The US
was a 500-ms electrocutaneous stimulus generated
by a Coulbourn Finger Stimulator. Shock electrodes
were placed on the palmar side of the middle and
index finger of the non-dominant hand.
Questionnaire
The neuroticism and extraversion scales of the
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire were used (EPQ;
Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). Items of the two scales
(21 for neuroticism and 19 for extraversion) were
mixed and had a binary response format (0 = no, 1 =
yes). Neuroticism was assessed to control for group
differences that may affect (generalised) fearful
responding (Lommen et al., 2010). Items of the extra-
version scale were only included to minimise the
impact of response tendencies.
Procedure
The experimental procedures were approved by the
local ethics review board. Participants received
Figure 1. Images that were used as the CS (left) and GS (right).
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written and oral information about the experimental
procedures. After providing written informed consent
and filling out the EPQ, they were subjected to a
shock work-up procedure that aimed at selecting a
level that was experienced as “highly uncomfortable,
but not painful” (cf. Leer et al., 2017). Participants
were given a series of different current flows, starting
at 0.2 mA, gradually increasing, and maxing at
4.0 mA. They were asked to rate each shock (0 = I
don’t feel anything; 1 = I feel something, but this is not
annoying, it is just a sensation; 2 = it starts to feel annoy-
ing, but it is still very much tolerable; 10 = this is the
maximum level I want to be exposed to) and they
were urged to notify the experimenter when their
maximum level was reached or when they wanted
shock intensity to be turned down. Next, the exper-
imental task commenced.
We used a non-differential fear acquisition and test
protocol, i.e. there was no control stimulus signalling
the absence of the US (cf. other human studies, e.g.
Boddez, Bennett, van Esch, & Beckers, 2017; Leer
et al., 2017, and most animal studies; Ghirlanda &
Enquist, 2003). Inclusion of a control stimulus is
known to affect fear generalisation, because respond-
ing is also determined by the perceived overlap
between the test stimulus (GS) and the control stimu-
lus (Ghirlanda & Enquist, 2003). Such an effect is unde-
sirable given that our hypotheses specifically pertain
to memory of the stimulus signalling the US. Further-
more, the nature of the control stimulus influences
feature learning (i.e. prioritising the processing of
stimulus features that uniquely predict the US) and
thereby affects fear generalisation (Vervliet & Geens,
2014). Inclusion of a control stimulus may thus cause
incomplete stimulus processing, which interferes
with (testing) the hypothesised time-dependent
changes in memory performance.
Practice phase. This phase served to help partici-
pants get familiar with the visual analogue scale
(VAS) that was used throughout the experiment to
assess online shock expectancy (0 = certainly no
shock; 100 = certainly a shock). Participants were
instructed that no shocks would be delivered and
they were urged to fill out each VAS within 6 s, as it
would disappear automatically. There were three prac-
tice trials, during which only the VAS was presented,
with 3, 4, or 5 s in between.
Acquisition phase. Participants were instructed that
they would occasionally receive shocks and that it
was their job to predict shock-occurrence and to indi-
cate shock expectancy each time the VAS would
appear on screen. They were then alternately
exposed to 12 baseline trials and 12 CS trials, starting
with a baseline trial. In between trials they looked at
blank (white) screens for a random duration of 3, 4,
or 5 s. Baseline trials involved a 6-s VAS presentation
against a blank (white) background. CS trials com-
prised the simultaneous presentation of the CS and
the VAS, for 6 s. At offset of nine randomly chosen CS
trials the 500-ms shock US occurred immediately.
Such partial reinforcement schedule (75%) was
chosen for two reasons. First, it arguably reduces the
impact of non-reinforced CS presentations during the
test phase. Second, it allows for the examination of
time-dependent increases in generalised fearful
responding over and above time-dependent increases
in conditioned fearful responding (i.e. incubation;
Wiltgen & Silva, 2007), which is impossible when fear
levels are maxing at pre-test.
Test phase. Only for participants in group “Day 1”
the test phase was scheduled immediately after the
acquisition phase (see Figure 2). For participants in
group “Day 8” and group “Day 8 reminder” the test
phase was scheduled 1 week later. Upon their return
to the lab, the electrodes were reattached and partici-
pants were told that shock intensity was set at the
level they had chosen in the previous session. Only
participants in group “Day 8 reminder” were then
Figure 2. Experimental procedure.
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exposed to the CS for 15 s and received the following
instructions: “You will now be presented the picture
that you saw in the first part of the experiment.
Please encode as much detail as possible”. These
instructions were added to maximise reinstatement
of the CS representation. At the start of the test
phase, all participants were told that they would be
presented with the picture of the face they had seen
in the first part of the experiment and other, some-
what different, faces. In fact, only one other face was
presented, but giving this information may have
resulted in reasoning-based rather than memory-
based responding. They were further instructed that
only the face that they had seen earlier would some-
times be followed by shock, that other faces would
not, and that they should indicate their shock expect-
ancy each time the VAS would appear on screen. Then,
in a fixed order, participants were exposed to a base-
line trial, a GS trial that involved the critical presen-
tation of the GS (non-reinforced), another baseline
trial, and a CS trial (non-reinforced). Note that some
other fear generalisation test protocols involve
random stimulus presentation, occasional reinforce-
ment of the CS, and a set of different GSs (Lissek
et al., 2010). However, occasional reinforcement and/
or CS presentation preceding GS presentation would
serve as a reminder treatment and thereby make it
impossible to test the hypothesis. And, while using a
set of different GSs enables investigation of the
shape of the generalisation gradient, it comes with
the limitation of CR extinction during the generalis-
ation sequence (Lissek et al., 2010). Therefore, and in
line with previous studies, we used only one GS (e.g.
Barry, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2016; Vervliet, Vansteenwe-
gen, & Eelen, 2004). During each trial, the VAS was pre-
sented for 6 s, which corresponded to the length of
the CS and GS presentations. Inter-trial-intervals had
a random duration of 3, 4, or 5 s.
Results
Randomisation check
There was no evidence for group differences in age,
level of neuroticism, shock intensity, Fs < 1, or
gender ratio, χ2(2, N = 60) = .04, p = .979, indicating
successful randomisation (see Table 1).
Fear learning
Mean US-expectancy ratings are shown in Figure 3. To
test whether acquisition of differential US-expectancy
took place, a 2(Stimulus: CS vs. baseline) × 3(Group:
Day 1 vs. Day 8 vs. Day 8 reminder) ANOVA was con-
ducted on the last trial of the acquisition phase.
There was a main effect of Stimulus, F(1, 57) =
236.93, p < .001, ηρ² = .806, with stronger shock
expectancy during the CS (M = 87.55, SD = 14.69)
than during baseline (M = 19.55, SD = 29.57). There
were no other effects, Fs < 1, meaning that acquisition
of differential US-expectancy was successful and unre-
lated to group.
Fear generalisation
First, we tested incubation, i.e. an increase in con-
ditioned fearful responding over time, as this may
interfere with our analysis of time-dependent fear
generalisation (e.g. Wiltgen & Silva, 2007). A 2(Stimu-
lus: CS vs. baseline) × 2(Group: Day 1 vs. Day 8)
ANOVA on the CS and first baseline trial during the
test phase only yielded a main effect of stimulus, F(1,
37) = 234.68, p < .001, ηρ² = .864, other Fs < 1,
meaning that responding did not increase over time.
Thus, any time-dependent changes in fear generalis-
ation could not be accounted for by incubation.
Next, we tested whether there were differences
between stimuli and groups in the test phase. A 3
(Stimulus: CS vs. GS vs. first baseline trial) × 3(Group)
ANOVA showed no main effect of Group, F(2, 55) =
1.34, p = .270. There was, however, a main effect of
Stimulus, F(2, 110) = 192.63, p < .001, ηρ² = .778,
which subsumed under a Stimulus × Group inter-
action, F(4, 110) = 2.82, p = .032, ηρ² = .093. To break-
down this interaction, separate ANOVAs were
performed for each stimulus. Results showed group
differences for US-expectancy ratings provided
during the GS, F(2, 59) = 4.71, p = .013, ω = .332, but
not for ratings provided during the CS, F(2, 59) =
Table 1. Means (SD) for age, neuroticism, individually set shock intensity, and gender ratio.
Group Age Neuroticism Shock intensity (mA) Gender ratio (F/M)
Day 1 21.76 (2.17) 7.33 (4.65) 2.29 (1.06) 13/8
Day 8 22.21 (2.88) 8.17 (5.69) 2.28 (0.99) 12/7
Day 8 reminder 21.70 (2.92) 5.95 (5.27) 2.25 (0.99) 12/8
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1.22, p = .303, or the baseline trial, F(2, 57) = 1.80,
p = .175 (see Figure 3).
To test the hypotheses, we calculated generalis-
ation indices (GIs) by taking the ratio of shock expect-
ancy during the GS test trial to shock expectancy
during the CS test trial (cf. Lenaert, van de Ven, Kaas,
& Vlaeyen, 2016). As such, a GI can be interpreted as
percentage generalisation from CS to GS, with 0%
reflecting no generalisation and 100% reflecting full
generalisation (see Figure 4). First, GIs of the three
groups were compared by a one-way ANOVA. This
analysis revealed a significant effect of Group, F(2,
59) = 7.38, p = .001, ω = .424. A first planned
comparison showed a higher GI in group Day 8 (M =
0.39, SD = .42) than in group Day 1(M = 0.09, SD
= .18), t(38) = 2.86, p = .009, d = .928 (variances were
not equal; corrected p-value reported). This result indi-
cates that installation of a 1-week retention interval
led to increased fear generalisation, and supports
the first hypothesis. A second planned comparison
revealed a lower GI in group Day 8 reminder (M =
0.11, SD = .14) as compared to group Day 8, t(37) =
2.80, p = .012, d = .894 (variances were not equal; cor-
rected p-value reported). This means that the remin-
der treatment at Day 8 resulted in weaker
generalisation of US-expectancy, which is in support
of the second hypothesis.
Discussion
The present experiment was designed to examine the
time dependence of human fear generalisation.
Results indicate that self-reported threat expectancy
to a generalisation stimulus significantly increases fol-
lowing a 1-week retention interval and that brief
exposure to the CS just prior to GS presentation
strongly reduces this effect. The findings support the
hypotheses and are in line with previous animal
research demonstrating that rats and mice exhibit
only low levels of fear expression when placed in a
novel context shortly after training, exhibit progress-
ively higher fear levels as the retention interval
increases, and that these time effects can be elimi-
nated when given a reminder treatment (Jasnow
et al., 2017).
Of importance, we found no evidence that group
differences in level of neuroticism or a general
increase in fear over time (incubation) could
Figure 3. Mean US-expectancy ratings during the acquisition (A1-12) and test phase (T1-T2). Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
Figure 4. Generalisation indices (GIs), i.e. ratios GS:CS of ratings pro-
vided during the test phase. GIs reflect the percentage of generalis-
ation from the CS to the GS. Error bars represent standard errors of
the mean.
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account for the time-dependent increase in fear gen-
eralisation. More likely, alterations in memory per-
formance, i.e. in discrimination acuity, were
causally involved. Although no independent test of
memory was performed, reinstatement of the CS
representation strongly affected responding at the
1-week retention test. It may accordingly be inferred
that reduced memory precision drove the effect of
time on fear generalisation. Still, there might be
another explanation of the findings. As an alterna-
tive to the result of recall performance, fear general-
isation has been conceptualised as an active process
driven by stimulus overlap (Struyf et al., 2015). This
account holds that generalisation can occur even
though the CS and GS are clearly perceptually dis-
criminable, because the individual adopts a better
safe than sorry strategy in the face of potential
danger. It follows that changes in fear generalisation
may be independent of changes in memory pre-
cision, but instead may have arisen because learning
was emotionally relevant. Possibly, the passage of
time feeds memory distrust, which in turn causes
individuals to more readily apply a better safe than
sorry approach, and thus show stronger fear general-
isation. Furthermore, a reminder treatment would
arguably restore confidence in memory and
thereby decrease the tendency of acting in a precau-
tionary way. Conclusions about the mechanisms
underlying the current findings thus require further
research, for example by including an independent
test of memory precision or memory confidence, or
by including confidence ratings of shock expectancy
at test. Also, to disambiguate the role of emotion,
future studies could test whether an aversive learn-
ing protocol is associated with stronger time-depen-
dent increases in fear generalisation compared to a
simple stimulus-stimulus protocol with a non-aver-
sive outcome (e.g. a picture paired with another
picture or sound).
Until the mechanisms of change are clear, clinical
implications of the current findings may best be con-
sidered at a functional level. Time-dependent changes
in fear generalisation may partly explain how normal
fear turns into pathological fear. That is, following a
traumatic learning experience, reductions in memory
precision/confidence may increase the range of
stimuli and situations that trigger the trauma
memory and subsequent fear responses. Obviously,
however, it would be excessive to state that the
mere passage of time results in the development of
anxiety disorders, because only a minority of
individuals develops clinical problems following a
traumatic event (Breslau et al., 1998). Alongside indi-
vidual differences in other risk factors, there may be
a tipping point in memory imprecision that should
be reached in order for fear generalisation to go
awry. This tipping point might be reached in some
individuals, e.g. those low in autobiographical
memory specificity, but not in others. At risk individ-
uals or patients suffering from anxiety-related dis-
orders might accordingly be encouraged to
strengthen their memory for stimuli that were
around at the time of the traumatic event. For
example, retrieval practice – the act of calling infor-
mation to mind – has been implicated in the long-
term retention of information (a phenomenon
referred to as the “testing effect”, Karpicke & Roediger,
2008). Occasionally recalling relevant cues that were
present at the time of the traumatic event may thus
prevent or attenuate excessive fear generalisation
(Sekeres et al., 2016).
Several issues deserve further attention. First, the
current findings not only warrant replication, but
also cross-validation with other fear measures such
as fear-potentiated startle or behavioural avoidance.
Although US-expectancy is considered a valid
measure of conditioned fear (Boddez et al., 2013), it
is only weakly correlated with physiological and
behavioural measures of fear (Mauss, Levenson,
McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). It is therefore of
interest to understand whether or not expression of
time-dependent fear generalisation differentiates
depending on the response system under investi-
gation. Second, the present focus was on fear general-
isation based on perceptual similarity, while many
other factors have been identified that influence fear
generalisation, such as the intensity of the CS and
US, and conceptual or categorical associations (Duns-
moor & Paz, 2015). For instance, humans possess the
ability to symbolically represent information and to
use this to make predictions about the potential
threat of novel stimuli, which enables fear generalis-
ation based on non-perceptual information (Dymond
et al., 2015). Because real-world fears typically
involve multidimensional stimuli about which people
likely have or will develop conceptual knowledge
(e.g. in fear of public places), higher-order reasoning
processes are likely to play a role in the development
of clinical fears (Dunsmoor & Murphy, 2015). Whether
the impact of non-perceptual factors on fear general-
isation is also affected by the passage of time remains
to be examined. Third, individuals show large
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differences in their ability to discriminate between
faces and to remember faces (e.g. Wilmer et al.,
2010) and it is unclear to what extent this affected
the current results. Fourth, prior to the generalisation
test phase we instructed participants that only the
face that they had seen earlier would sometimes be
followed by shock, which may have reduced levels
of uncertainty and thereby dampened the strength
of fear generalisation. Because the instructions were
given in all groups, it seems unlikely that they
mediated the observed group differences. Still, it
may be interesting to test the current hypothesis
using different instructions.
In summary, fear generalisation has been impli-
cated in the pathogenesis of anxiety-related disorders,
which underlines the importance of understanding
what factors facilitate or reduce it. We provided the
first evidence that the mere passage of time increases
human fear generalisation, which may partly explain
the transition from normal fear to pathological fear.
We further demonstrated that a reminder treatment
eliminates this effect. Future studies may be aimed
at replicating and cross-validating the current
findings, at uncovering underlying mechanisms, and
at investigating the time-dependence of non-percep-
tual forms of fear generalisation.
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